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INTRODUCTION
Appellant Christopher Shanahan relies on the facts and arguments in his
opening brief, and will not repeat those here, but he does wish to take this opportunity
to reply to a few topics raised in the State’s brief.
The State contends primarily that because Mr. Shanahan did not receive a formal
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, any argument that his life
sentence, with 35 years fixed, is now illegal due to fundamental changes in
constitutional law related to juvenile sentencing fails. (Brief of Respondent, pp. 5-6.) Mr.
Shanahan respectfully disagrees and contends that the State overlooks several core
constitutional principles from Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery that apply to his
case.
The State also asserts that a claim that Mr. Shanahan’s sentence amounts to cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment based on disproportionality is
barred by res judicata because an Eighth Amendment proportionality claim was raised
in Mr. Shanahan’s direct appeal under then existing law. (Brief of Respondent, pp. 8-9.)
This is not the same claim, however, due to subsequent and material changes in the law.
Res judicata does not bar the Court from addressing it.
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REPLY ARGUMENT
I.
The constitutional rules from Miller and Montgomery apply to this case.
The State argues that, “Miller only applies to juvenile offenders who were
sentenced to fixed life terms. Shanahan was not sentenced to a fixed life term. Miller,
therefore, does not apply to Shanahan’s case or sentence.” (Brief of Respondent, p. 5.) In
pressing its argument, the State reduces the constitutional law to an overly simplistic
baseline and ignores core principles and reasoning from Miller and Montgomery, which
were themselves a culmination of over a decade of legal transformation related to
juvenile sentencing.
The primary rule to emerge from the line of Supreme Court cases set out in Mr.
Shanahan’s opening brief is the children are constitutionally different than adults and
must be sentenced differently. Scientific research, and now constitutional law, tell us
this. Children and adolescents are impulsive. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2467‐68
(2012). They can be reckless. Id. They take risks without appreciating the consequences.
Id. They are more prone to a negative family environment and peer influences. Id. They
are at a disadvantage in dealing with police and prosecutors, including in determining
whether to plead guilty. Id. The do not mature mentally and morally until their mid-20s.
Id. All of these characteristics diminish their culpability. Id. at 2465. The typical equation
for sentencing adult offenders must necessarily yield to an altogether different calculus
2

for juveniles. For instance, deterrence is less effective on youthful offenders. Id.
Childhood characteristics also weaken a rationale for extreme punitiveness. Id. at 2466.
And there is a much stronger likelihood of change and rehabilitation. Id. at 2465.
In short, children whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth are in a
constitutionally distinct class, separate and apart from adults who commit the same
crime. Christopher Shanahan is a member that class.
Other state courts have held the principles and reasoning from Roper to Graham
to Miller to Montgomery apply to cases in which a juvenile offender was sentenced to
something other than life without the possibility of parole, see Brief of Appellant, pp. 1214 (discussing cases), and this Court should follow their lead. See also Peterson v. State,
193 So.3d 1034, 1038-39 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (“we conclude that the court's
admonition that a constitutional sentence is one that provides a meaningful opportunity
for early release is not satisfied simply because the juvenile may be geriatrically released
from prison at some point before the conclusion of his or her statistical or actuarial life
expectancy.”)(emphasis in original); Davis v. State, 415 P.3d 666 (Wyo. 2018) (reaffirming
that a lengthy term for years can be the “functional equivalent” of a life sentence
triggering Miller review, holding that there is a presumption against life sentences for
juveniles, and setting out certain procedures for sentencing juveniles.)
Nevertheless, the State contends that even if Miller were to apply to this case, Mr.
Shanahan received constitutionally adequate consideration of the attributes of youth.
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(Brief of Respondent, pp. 6-7.) As the State points out, Mr. Shanahan’s trial counsel
presented some mental health testimony related to aspects of Mr. Shanahan’s personal
development and maturity. (Id.) And, in its written findings regarding the weighing of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances (as if this were a death-eligible case), the trial
court noted Mr. Shanahan’s age and expressed “hope” that he could be rehabilitated.
(Appeal No. 23, 965, Clerk’s Rec., p. 191.) But the court more than negated even that
snippet of consideration with a notation that “murders continue in our society and,
alarmingly, they are all too often committed by teenagers.” (Id.)
This review is simply not the type of searching inquiry that the Eighth
Amendment requires. As Mr. Shanahan wrote in his opening brief, the distinction that
the Idaho Supreme Court has previously made when reviewing pre-Miller sentences is
whether a trial court adequately considered the developmental state of an adolescent’s
brain compared to an adult and how youth are more prone to impulsivity and more
likely to be able to be rehabilitated. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 15-18) (citing and comparing
Johnson v. State, 162 Idaho 213, 223, 395 P.3d 1246, 1258 (2017) and Adamcik v. State, 163
Idaho 114, 408 P.3d 474, 488 (2017), with Windom v. State, 162 Idaho 417, 398 P.3d 150
(2017)). In this case, the trial court was presented with some mental health evidence of
Mr. Shanahan’s personal development, but not it was not presented with evidence
about, nor did it meaningfully weigh and assess, adolescent development generally and
how that bears on the likelihood of rehabilitation compared to an adult. In the mid4

1990s, that was not on the constitutional radar. Now it is mandated. Mr. Shanahan’s
case is more like Windom in that regard, and not like Johnson or Adamcik.
II.
Res judicata is not a bar to this Court’s consideration of a claim that, in light of an
intervening and material change in the law, Mr. Shanahan’s sentence is
disproportionate and independently violates the Eighth Amendment.
The State next asserts that because an Eighth Amendment claim was raised on
direct appeal in 1999, in which Mr. Shanahan’s counsel argued that the sentence was
disproportionate to the offense, “re-litigation of this issue is barred by the doctrine of
res judicata.” (Brief of Respondent, p. 8.)
“Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue
preclusion (collateral estoppel).” Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805
(2002). “Under principles of claim preclusion, a valid final judgment rendered on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action
between the same parties upon the same claim.” Id. (citation omitted). The doctrine of
res judicata contains narrow exceptions, however, including “ineffective assistance of
counsel, newly discovered evidence, or changes in the controlling law.” State v.
Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 618, 903 P.3d 1305, 1315 (1995) (citing Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho
758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988)).
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That last exception mentioned in Lankford applies here. There has been a
fundamental shift in the law since the time that this claim was initially raised and
decided. As such, this is not the same claim. The constitutional analysis that must be
applied when a juvenile is sentenced to a lengthy term for years – regardless whether it
is a life sentence – must be viewed through a much different lens than the one that the
Court of Appeals used. There, it focused heavily on the facts of the offense. State v.
Shanahan, 133 Idaho 896, 901, 994 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Ct. App. 1999). Now, courts are
required to take into consideration the attendant characteristics of youth, which
squarely informs the individual juvenile’s level of culpability, the proper role of
deterrence and punishment, and the capacity for rehabilitation, in ways that were not a
requirement at the time of appellate review in the 1990s.
In fact, in 2012 the Miller Court brushed aside strict adherence to the
longstanding disproportionality test from Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991),
noting that it was inapposite. The Court wrote, “Harmelin had nothing to do with
children and did not purport to apply its holding to the sentencing of juvenile
offenders. We have by now held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule
permissible for adults may not be so for children.” Miller, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012).
Just as “death is different” in capital case review “children are different too.” Id.
This Eighth Amendment claim is a new one. For that reason, this Court should
conclude that res judicata does not prohibit consideration of the merits anew. Mr.
6

Shanahan’s youthful characteristics fit in all of the categories set out in Graham, Miller,
and Montgomery, as he has addressed in his opening brief. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 2122.) Taking those factors in consideration, a sentence of life in prison with 35 years
fixed, imposed on a juvenile who was 15 years old when he committed this crime is far
beyond excessive and is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Shanahan requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order and
remand for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted on this 27th day of November, 2018.
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Craig Durham
Attorney for Petitioner

7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that this Reply Brief has been served on the following on this
27th day of November, 2018, by filing it and serving it through the Court’s e-filing
system:

RUSSELL SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0100
Attorney for Respondent

£44

Craig H. Durham

8

